Monday, August 29, 2011

Poetic Diction and its Discontents



Daniel Tiffany

Chapter 2 of Arresting Poetry: Poetic Diction and the Substance of Kitsch

Doppelgänger

Modernist definitions of kitsch frequently identify kitsch as the antithesis of art (or, in Greenberg’s case, of the avant-garde), yet they also acknowledge a genealogical relation between art and kitsch. Broch, for example, declares, “we can say that Romanticism, without therefore being kitsch itself, is the mother of kitsch and that there are moments when the child becomes so like its mother that one cannot differentiate them.” The idea that kitsch becomes so much like art that the two cannot be differentiated recalls Francis Jeffrey’s judgment concerning the ostensibly divergent “beauties” of vulgar and refined poetries: “the qualities in a poem that give the most pleasure to the refined and fastidious critic are, in substance, we believe, the very same that delight the most injudicious of its admirers.” Jeffrey and Broch both stress the uncanny similarities between art and kitsch, yet Broch warns the reader not to view kitsch as merely derivative or imitative, stressing instead its insidious autonomy: “Kitsch is certainly not ‘bad art’; it forms its own closed system, which is lodged like a foreign body in the overall system of art.” Hence Broch views kitsch as at once contingent upon art--a genealogical descendant of it--and independent of it. Kitsch bears an uncanny resemblance to art, yet operates according to an autonomous “system” which undermines the values of art. Contrasting the destructive effects of internal and external threats--of kitsch and propaganda--to art, Broch states, “The enemy within, however, is more dangerous than these attacks from outside; every system is dialectically capable of developing its own anti-system and is indeed compelled to do so. The danger is all the greater when at first glance the system and the anti-system appear to be identical.” What the system and the anti-system, art and kitsch, share in common (according to both Jeffrey and Broch) is the “substance” of beauty.

If we accept the premise that kitsch emerges historically from a schism dividing art into system and anti-system, then we must acknowledge that the principal thesis of this book--that kitsch originates with poetry--will have a significant bearing on the question of when and how the crisis in art leading to the emergence of kitsch occurs. That is to say, if kitsch emerges as the result of a crisis in the conditions of art, and kitsch originates specifically with poetry (and not, more broadly speaking, with the rise of industrial culture), then we must search for evidence of a schism or rupture in the history of poetry per se, in order to explain the historical emergence of kitsch.

The question of poetry’s priority in the genealogy of kitsch bears directly on the larger question of whether kitsch should be regarded as a product of industrial capitalism, as Marxist analysis requires (a view supporting its fundamental correlation with material culture); or whether kitsch, as Broch claims, must be understood essentially as “a specific product of Romanticism” (a view supporting the idea that kitsch arises from a particular crisis in the history of poetry). These two positions are not, of course, entirely incompatible, but if kitsch originates specifically with poetry--and with the conditions of the Romantic Revival in the latter part of the eighteenth century in particular--then one cannot provide an adequate explanation of the origins of kitsch by focusing solely on the rise of the industrial capitalism and consumption in relation to the arts in general.

It was Francis Jeffrey who first identified poetic diction as the appropriate framework for a discussion of “very popular poetry”--a mode of verse signaling the emergence of a poetic anti-system, a lyric antibody to literature. By implication, therefore, Jeffrey established the criteria for assessing the earliest manifestations of kitsch arising in tandem, but also at odds with, what came to be known as the canon of Romantic poetry. That is to say, his essays in the Edinburgh Review in the first two decades of the nineteenth century indicate that the schism in poetry leading to the emergence of kitsch developed as a result of various experiments in poetic diction. These experiments were responding at once to the increasing appeal of literary antiquarianism and to the introduction of vernacular sources--principally prose--into school curricula and “literary” culture during the eighteenth century. These contradictory developments led, on the one hand, to the emergence of the category of “literature” and, on the other hand, to provisional formations of mass culture, anchored initially in the medium of print and in what one might call the “genre wars” between poetry and literature.

Careful examination of these historical developments reveals in fact that the schism underlying the emergence of kitsch occurred not between literature and popular culture as we know it today, but between the residual genre of poetry and the emergent super-genre of literature. A renegade and conservative subgenre of poetry--the precursor of kitsch--forged a recalcitrant language from archaic diction and a radicalized vernacular to avoid the middle ground of polite conversation--the purity of diction--cultivated by the new school of literary poets (Wordsworth and his followers). In this bitter and melancholy contest, it was a refractory and militant form of poeticism that established the dialectical terms of kitsch and mass culture, becoming the hyperbolically poetic anti-system to the middling, bourgeois system of literature.

In an essay of 1810, reviewing Walter Scott’s The Lady of the Lake, Jeffrey argues that his thesis regarding the common substance of beauty shared by vulgar and refined poetries can be confirmed by attending to “the history and effects of what may be called Poetical diction in general, or even of such particular phrases and epithets as have been indebted to their beauty for too great a notoriety.” Thus, Jeffrey not only identifies diction as the key to understanding the nature of poetic kitsch, but he acknowledges the contradictory judgments called forth by the “phrases and epithets” of poetic diction: “Our associations with all this class of expressions, which have become trite only in consequence of their intrinsic excellence, now suggest to us no ideas but those of schoolboy imbecility and childish affectation.” No longer able to recognize the “intrinsic excellence” of such expressions--and allowing their beauty to become a source of “notoriety”--“We look upon them merely as the common, hired, and tawdry trappings of all those who wish to put on, for the hour, the masquerade habit of poetry.” Jeffrey seeks to remind the cultivated reader of “the vivifying spirit of strength and animation” in Scott’s poetry even as he acknowledges the heterogeneity of its diction:

With regard to diction and imagery, too, it is quite obvious that Mr. Scott has not aimed at writing either in a very pure or a very consistent style. He seems to have been anxious only to strike, and to be easily and universally understood, and, for this purpose, to have culled the most glittering and conspicuous expressions of the most popular authors, and to have interwoven them in splendid confusion with his own nervous diction and irregular verification.

The great popularity of Scott’s poetry, which Jeffrey views as a sign of its intrinsic merit, can be attributed then to a combination of “nervous diction” (a form of intertextuality), its preoccupation with effects (“anxious only to strike”), and to the accessibility granted to the “animation” of these qualities.

Jeffrey’s observations about poetic diction often serve as a way of theorizing about the anomalous features of “popular poetry” (Scott, Byron, and Keats are his favorites)--about kitsch. One might therefore note that the history of the concept of diction in relation to poetics--reaching back to Aristotle--frequently addresses the question of poetic popularity and therefore serves as a prehistory of the problem of kitsch in poetry. Jeffrey’s emphasis on the impurity--the “splendid confusion”--of Scott’s diction in his evaluation of popular poetry offers a good example of this concordance.

Synthetic Vernaculars

In Aristotle’s foundational discussion of diction (lexis)--understood as a function of vocabulary--he states, “Diction is at its clearest when composed of words in everyday use, but then it is commonplace.... An impressive diction, on the other hand, one that escapes the ordinary, results from the use of strange words, by which I mean foreign words, metaphors, expanded words, and whatever departs from normal usage.” To avoid the extremes of the “drab” and the enigmatic, Aristotle explains, “What is needed, therefore, is a blend, so to speak, of these ingredients, since the unfamiliar element...will save the diction from being drab and commonplace, while the colloquial element will ensure its clarity.” Thus poetic diction in general is a highly synthetic medium founded upon the vernacular, yet mixing the commonplace and the unfamiliar, the drab and the ornamental, the colloquial and the arcane.

One cannot help but note the surprising correspondence between the classical formulation of poetic diction and the particular qualities of Scott’s “nervous” yet popular poetry, comprising “a diction tinged successfully with the careless richness of Shakespeare, the harshness and the antique simplicity of the old romances, the loneliness of vulgar ballads and anecdotes, and the sentimental glitter of the most modern poetry--passing from the borders of the ludicrous to those of the sublime.” Jeffrey here describes a poetic language accessible to a mass audience, combining simplicity, vulgarity, archaism, sublimity, and the “sentimental glitter” of modern phrasing.

Following Aristotle’s definition, variations of the concept of a synthetic vernacular--a common language alienated from common usage--have figured prominently in discussions of poetic diction. For example, Dante’s seminal (and unfinished) essay on language and poetry, De Vulgari Eloquentia, addresses the problem of diction by elaborating the advantages of writing in the vernacular--in one’s native tongue, instead of Latin. At the same time, the title of his treatise, Eloquence in the Vulgar Tongue conveys the crucial idea of a synthetic language combining vulgarity and refinement, the familiar and the unfamiliar. According to Dante, “vernacular language is that which we learn without any formal instruction,” yet he is careful to explain that the vernacular--as a medium for poetry--“has left its scent in every city but made its home in none.” The vernacular, then, is “common to all yet owned by none,” a medium “tempered by the combination of opposites”: a language that is at once “womanish” and “brutally harsh,” belonging to no place and spoken, in effect, by no one. Ultimately, in a figure of speech I will adopt for the present study, Dante describes the vernacular as a “homeless stranger.” In Italian, Dante uses the term peregrinatur--wanderer, vagabond--suggesting that the poetic vernacular is not merely homeless, but outside the bounds of ordinary usage: a miscreant language.

The problem of poetic diction in the English tradition emerged as a visible and substantial polemic with the publication of the preface (along with various other textual appendices) to the Lyrical Ballads (especially the revised preface of the 1802 edition). The polarization of views is epitomized, on the one hand, by Wordsworth’s articulation of the first programmatic stance against poetic diction (embodied, in his view, by Gray’s insularity and the new barbarism of Gothic verse) and, on the other hand, by Jeffrey’s defense of poetic “animation”: sublimity and strong feelings, yet also irregularity of diction and a reliance upon borrowed sources.

The preface to the Lyrical Ballads (and the controversies surrounding it) is in fact a culmination of experiments and disputes over diction reaching back to the middle of the eighteenth century. In addition, stepping back even further, although Wordsworth addresses a range of issues pertaining to the immediate historical debate he inherits, he also inevitably conveys and revises the terms of a longer, episodic conversation about poetic diction reaching back to the early seventeenth century. He does so in order to reinforce the values of the “plainer and more emphatic language” he deemed appropriate for poetry. Wordsworth’s contrast between the “inane phraseology” of poetic diction and the “real language of men,” echoes the categories of diction established in the earliest commentaries about English poetry. Ben Jonson, for example, contrasts “a verse as smooth, as soft, as cream;/In which there is no torrent, nor scarce stream” with a verse in which one finds “nothing but what is rough and broken.” Of the first kind of poet, Jonson remarks, “Women’s poets they are called: as you have women’s tailors... They are cream-bowl, or but puddle deep”; and of the latter kind: “They would not have it run without rubs, as if that style were more strong and manly, that struck the ear with a kind of unevenness.” Though the commentary becomes more partisan (a seventeenth-century preface to Cleveland’s poetry contrasts “strenuous masculine style” with “enervous effeminate froth”), Jonson, Dryden, and later Samuel Johnson, call for a blend of the strong and the smooth.

The basic framework of this polemic about poetic diction clearly recalls the Aristotelian model of a synthetic vernacular combining disparate elements: familiar and unfamiliar, colloquial and arcane, drab and ornamental, rough and smooth. At the same time, the potentially “vicious” nature of either type of diction (rough or smooth) is often attributed in the English tradition to the incorporation of foreign sources, to the effects of translation. Dryden, for example, commenting on the strength of Jonson’s diction, remarks, “perhaps, too, he did a little too much Romanize our tongue, leaving the words which he translated almost as much Latin as he found them: wherein, though he learnedly followed their language, he did not enough comply with the idiom of ours.”

Infatuation with the foreign and the unfamiliar could also, by contrast, exaggerate the delicacy of tone prized by the so-called Cavalier poets. Herrick, and even a poet like Cowley (usually associated with the robust style of the Metaphysical poets), produced collections of Anacreontiques, described by Samuel Johnson as “paraphrastical translations of some little poems, which pass, however justly, under the name of Anacreon.” These dubious translations yield “songs dedicated,” Johnson explains, “to festivity and gaiety, in which even the morality is voluptuous.” Recalling Ben Jonson’s comparison of “women’s poets” to “women tailors,” Douglas Bush finds in Herrick’s diction “the feminine particularity of a dressmaker...the phrases are a succession of delicate or delicately mock-heroic paradoxes which turn a woman into a dainty rogue in porcelain, and one whose roguishness is not limited to her costume.”

The “intermixture of tongues” (as Coleridge calls it) can therefore produce either the Romanized diction of Jonson’s hybrid tongue or the delicate but “rogue” phrasing of Herrick’s songs. In both cases, impurities of diction result from excessive exposure to (and incorporation of) foreign languages. Some have even claimed (including Coleridge) that the origins of bad taste--of poetic kitsch--may be found in the impurities of diction cultivated by a classical education. But that is only part of the story.

Subduing Poetry

By the time Wordsworth published his manifesto calling for a poetry based on “the language of conversation,” the historical commentary on poetic diction--or types of diction--had evolved into a ferocious debate about the distinguishing features of poetry itself (in contrast to prose)--about the “essence” of poetic language. In the 50 years preceding Wordsworth’s publication of the preface, several momentous changes were taking place in the realm of “letters” which placed in question the basic verbal criteria of poetry. More precisely, neoclassical poetics and the preeminence of poetry as the only classical genre (even drama was written in verse) came under pressure from the gradual introduction of vernacular writing into school curricula and from the development of a vernacular canon (in English), which included for the first time the nebulous genre of prose fiction. As a consequence of these developments, since the language of prose was understood to be more colloquial than that of poetry, or less beholden to ancient sources, it was inevitable that a new supergenre--called “literature”--would emerge to encompass the various levels of diction ranging from poetry to prose fiction to prose essay (a genre initially included within the domain of literature--of “polite letters”).

Though the verbal category of the vernacular was itself contested (as being grounded either in the language of “rustics”--as Wordsworth liked to think--or in “polite conversation”), one could reasonably claim, as John Guillory notes, that “it is only vernacular writing that has the power to bring into existence the category of ‘literature’ in the specific sense of poetry, novels, plays, and so on.” In addition, the reciprocal appearance of a model of Standard English guaranteed the value of writing associated with the category of literature, which in turn became the ultimate measure of usage (as the examples of usage in the O.E.D. attest). Hence, as Guillory explains, “Purity of diction [a marker of the literary indifference of the languages of poetry and prose] requires the participation of nearly all writing genres in the forging of a standard vernacular, in other words, a linguistically homogeneous bourgeois public sphere.”

At the same time, as the new supergenre of literature acquired the prestige and legitimacy to function as a vehicle for bourgeois social emulation (occupying the middle ground between classicism and “unimproved” common speech), the archaic and insular diction of poetry came under increasing pressure to assimilate itself to the middle ground of “polite letters” and prosaic language. A polemical school of poetry therefore appeared which rejected the “gaudiness and inane phraseology” of poetic diction and, correspondingly, advocated a new “purity” of diction grounded in “the language of conversation”--a language “purified indeed from what appear to be is real defects.”

Wordsworth was not the first poet, as we have seen, to make a distinction between “corrupt” diction and the qualities of the “plain style,” but he was the first to advocate a programmatic rejection of poetic diction: “There will also be found in the volumes little of what is usually called poetic diction; I have taken as much pains to avoid it as others ordinarily take to produce it.” He goes to considerable lengths in the Preface (supplemented by a separate “Appendix” on the subject of “poetic diction” in 1802) to explain the basis of the “adulterated phraseology” of poetic diction, condemning its “abuses” and “corruptions,” its “wanton deviation from good sense and nature,” its “extravagant and absurd language,” its “gross and violent stimulants.” Ultimately, he explains, poets “became proud of a language which they themselves invented and which was uttered only by themselves.” He condemns in particular the formulaic nature of “phrases and figures of speech which from father to son have long been regarded as the common inheritance of Poets...and which have been foolishly repeated by bad Poets.” As a result, “the taste of men was gradually perverted; and this language was received as a natural language.”

Wordsworth, it seems, wished to replace one “natural” language with another. And he was not alone in ridiculing the “quaintnesses, hieroglyphics and enigmas” of poetic diction. The growing prestige of vernacular writing, along with the controversies surrounding the distinction between poetry and prose, had already begun to cast doubt on the integrity of poetic language. Coleridge, too--though in a manner for less doctrinaire than Wordsworth--shows no hesitation in condemning “the unmeaning repetition, habitual phrases and other blank counters” of poetic diction; he, too, appears to reject “the false and showy splendours” of the poet’s inheritance. Yet Wordsworth radicalized his campaign against poetic diction--a step Coleridge was unwilling to take--by equating the languages of poetry and prose: “there neither is, nor can be, any essential difference between the language of Prose and metrical composition.” Stripped of the “foreign splendor” of poetic diction, the language of poetry reveals itself to be no different from prose or indeed from common speech.

The material distinction between poetry and prose depends entirely, according to Wordsworth, on the “charm” of meter “superadded” to natural language: “The only strict antithesis to Prose is Metre.” Hence the specifically poetic character of Wordsworth’s writing is achieved, he claims, solely “by fitting to metrical arrangement a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid sensation.” By implication, without meter --and without the “gross and violent stimulants” of poetic diction--poetry ceases to exist in material terms: a formulation so restrictive that it would deny the name of poetry to the bulk of post-metrical, colloquial “poetry” written in the twentieth century.

Wordsworth’s emphasis on “vivid sensation” preserves, however, a means of distinguishing poetry from prose without reference to any material properties of language--a distinction that would become crucial to the integrity of much poetry written in the twentieth century. When Wordsworth declares, “all good Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of feeling,” he implies (perhaps inadvertently) that poetry can exist, in essence, solely as a state of feeling in the poet and in the reader--without possessing any distinctive or consistent verbal properties. According to Jean-Pierre Mileur, the Wordsworth of the Preface argues that “one is not a poet by virtue of actually having written poetry but by virtue of an essential disposition of the self.” Under such conditions, poetry persists not as a particular verbal formation but as a state of heightened sensibility. Without metrical constraint or the miscreant language of poetic diction, poetry can be distinguished from prose only in the most feeble terms, requiring the substance of poetry to retreat from the page to the sensibility of the poet. Guillory declares, “In the absence of poetic diction, the distinction between poetry and prose must be maintained elsewhere, as an assertion of the difference embodied in the poetic sensibility.” Poetry is poetry not because it may be distinguished from prose in any material sense, but because it expresses--in ways extrinsic to its actual verbal properties--the sensibility of the poet. Wordsworth, like many others (including his principal adversary, Francis Jeffrey) equates poetry with passion, yet his erasure of distinctions between the languages of poetry and prose--his willingness to dematerialize poetry, to force its withdrawal into the sensibility of the poet--reveals the fundamental importance of poetic diction to the material identity and viability of poetry.

Challenges to the integrity of poetic language in the latter part of the eighteenth century, culminating in Wordsworth’s attack on poetic diction, provoked reactions from various poets and critics reasserting the “peculiarity” of poetic language--a development essential to the conditions leading to the emergence of poetic kitsch. Robert Heron, for example, a critic whom Wordsworth paraphrases approvingly in the preface, rejects Wordsworth’s equation of the languages of prose, poetry, and conversation: “The purposes of poetry are therefore most successfully accomplished when its sentiments and images are conveyed in appropriated language and measures, distinct from those of prose.” Adopting a similar stance, Coleridge, despite his avowed distaste for “artificial phrases” and “pseudo-poesy,” defies (and indeed mocks the phrasing of) Wordsworth’s equation of poetry and prose: “there may be, is and ought to be, an essential difference between the language of prose and of metrical composition.” Regarding his own poetic practice, Coleridge states simply, “I write in metre because I am about to use a language different from that of prose.”

Defending the idea of a language appropriate to poetry, Coleridge’s position resembles--though it is free of condescension and the ugliest forms of class bias--the views of Francis Jeffrey, who condemns “Mr. Wordsworth’s open violation of the established laws of poetry” and his repudiation of “expressions which have been sanctified by the use of famous writers, or which bear the stamp of a simple or venerable antiquity.” Jeffrey’s defense of poetic language is directly linked, one must emphasize, to his focus on poetic diction in his formulations of “popular poetry,” of what can later be identified--with radically different class connotations--as kitsch in poetry.

These views on the propriety and idiosyncrasy of poetic language echo a line of defense which arose midway through the eighteenth century in response to the increasing popularity of prose and shifting views about generic distinctions. Oliver Goldsmith, for example, anticipating the terms of Wordsworth’s polemic, declares in 1765 (the year in which he produced--anonymously--the first edition of Mother Goose), “If poetry exists independent of versification, it will naturally be asked, how then is it to be distinguished? Undoubtedly by its own peculiar expression; it has a language of its own.” More polemically, Thomas Gray (whom Wordsworth identified as “the head of those who, by their reasonings, have attempted to widen the space of separation betwixt Prose and metrical composition”) wrote in a letter of 1742 to Richard West: “As a matter of stile, I have this to say: the language of the age is never the language of poetry.... Our poetry [in contrast to that of the French] has a language peculiar to itself; to which almost everyone that has written has added something by enriching it with foreign idioms and derivatives: nay sometimes words of their own composition or invention.” Samuel Johnson echoes Gray’s notorious views as he explains Gray’s tendency to drive a phrase “beyond apprehension”: “Gray thought his language more poetical as it was more remote from common use.

Commonplace

Gray’s defense of poetic diction--of the “peculiarity” of poetic language--cannot be isolated from his use of what Heron calls “appropriated language and measures” in his own poetic practice. Gray preserved and enhanced the singularity of poetic language by following a “purely anthological principle” in his writing, by the compositional method of the commonplace book. In the Renaissance study of classical rhetoric, commonplaces are common topoi associated with the art of memory: topics, themes, quotations (and ultimately clichés) essential to the mastery of a particular field. One therefore collected commonplaces (quotations of Greek and Latin authors) in a commonplace book, a practice which had evolved by the eighteenth century to include the incorporation of not only vernacular writing, but letters, dried flowers, and other types of “evidence”--in the manner of a scrapbook. As a pedagogical device, then, the commonplace book was at once an aid to reading or memorization and a compositional tool: a notebook or matrix of sources in which poems could take shape.

The production and use of commonplace books had always been oriented primarily around the genre of poetry and, not surprisingly, Gray’s personal commonplace book (which ran to a thousand pages) was the matrix of his own verse. Yet the introduction of vernacular writing into school curricula during Gray’s lifetime brought about a shift in the types of poetry recorded in commonplace books. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, according to David Allan, “the familiar classics-heavy canon was not only being substantially supplemented. It was actually being supplanted, even among active commonplacers, by a growing preference for vernacular poetry in general and for comparatively recent British poetry in particular.” In addition to the dissemination of vernacular poetry, the rising popularity of new prose genres (fiction, essays, journalism) contributed significantly as well to the gradual demise of commonplace books (and to their conversion into anthologies, scrapbooks, and diaries).

Evidence of the declining prestige of the commonplace book (and its rarefied poetic contents) began to emerge with essays such as Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), which posed the question, “Why are Originals so few?” Concern over the deleterious effects of commonplacing on poetic production evolved within a generation to Hazlitt’s outright scorn for the idolatrous cast of a classical education: “The ignorant, as well as the adept, were charmed only with what was obsolete and far-fetched, wrapped up in technical terms and in a learned tongue.” These shifts in the status of the commonplace, which reflect an unprecedented decline in the generic value of poetry, are in fact recorded in transformations in the usage of meaning of the term: the “commonplace” went from being something to be revered, collected, and reproduced, to a synonym for the vulgar, the insipid, the unoriginal--as reflected in our own usage of the term. What we mean by “commonplace” today is precisely the opposite of what it meant to Thomas Gray in 1750.

The incoherence of the history of the usage of the word “commonplace” extends as well to our assumptions about the class connotations of the types of poetry composed by “commonplace” methods during their decline. That is to say, we presume that the poets who remained wedded to the anthological method and classical materials of the commonplace book were anything but “commonplace.” In fact, we tend to view belated classicists such as Gray, who insisted on the peculiarity and insularity of poetic diction, as elitists. Yet evidence of the opinions of their peers indicates quite the opposite.

Wordsworth, for example, who accused Gray of seeking “to widen the space of separation” between poetry and prose, also identified his “curiously elaborate” diction as the basis of “the popular Poetry of the day”--in contrast to his own “experiments” with ordinary language. In the Preface, Wordsworth warned that, “in order entirely to enjoy the Poetry which I am recommending, it would be necessary to give up much of what is ordinarily enjoyed”--that is, the “inane phraseology” of Gray’s poetic diction. Hence, it was Gray, not Wordsworth, who was writing “popular” poetry.

The class connotations of this polemic render the emerging conflict between “commonplace” poetry and the emerging “literary”--ostensibly colloquial--poetry of Wordsworth’s new program. Gray, we must recall, came from relatively humble origins--his mother was a milliner--and his close friendship with Horace Walpole (the son of a Prime Minister, whom Gray met at Eton College--the same Walpole who wrote the first Gothic novel, The Castle of Otranto) was estranged for a time due to Gray’s displeasure with Walpole’s social priorities. (On a lengthy Grand Tour of Europe--at Walpole’s expense--the two parted in Italy, it is said, over Walpole’s inclination to attend fashionable parties, in contrast to Gray’s plans to visit antiquities). Above all, one must attend to evidence of class affiliations--the specter of working-class Gothic--embedded in Gray’s most famous poem, “Elegy Written in a Country Church Yard,” which calls attention to the graves of the “rude Forefathers” of the plowman and the swain: “Let not ambition mock their useful toil,/Their homely joys, and destiny obscure.” Furthermore, as Joshua Scodel notes, “By imagining his own burial and monument in the churchyard, Gray links himself in death to the poor whose worth he defends against the ‘proud’.”

These symptoms of class affiliation become inverted--though the antagonism remains--in Donald Davie’s comparison of Wordsworth’s “sobriety” with the “glare and glitter” of Gray and other “poets of the uprooted.” By this cryptic phrase, Davie means to contrast “the uprooted, nomadic, and classless type of the governess and the paid companion” (a “classless” type encompassing the poetic values of Thomas Gray) with the “urbanity” of poets such as Wordsworth and Shelley. The vulgarity of Gray’s diction (its “glare and glitter”) stands in contrast, then, to the “purity of diction” cultivated by Wordsworth, which is at once “a sign of good breeding” (according to Davie) and a symptom of the emergent, bourgeois ideology of literature. Hence the glare and glitter of Gray’s belated and alienated classicism resists, through its “commonplace” method of poetic composition, the aspirational goals and the patronizing colloquialism of literature. By resisting the advancing, bourgeois hegemony of literature (aligned with prose fiction and “polite letters”), by removing itself from “the language of the age,” the substance of poetic diction reveals affinities between “commonplace” methods of composition and the nascent regime of the mass ornament, between high kitsch and low culture.

The correlation between the methodology of the commonplace book and Gray’s own poetry is close enough for one critic to declare that “Gray’s Elegy is composed in much the same manner as a commonplace book.” John Guillory indeed refers to “the cento of quotable quotations that is the poem,” describing it as “an anthology of literary clichés,” and noting that “its phrases sound familiar even in the absence of identified pretexts, as though it were the anonymous distillation of literary sententiae.” The “Elegy” therefore functions like a “rhapsody” (a term synonymous with “anthology”), an assemblage of poetic formulae stitched together by the poet. Mobilized against the reproductive bias of Gray’s poetics, and adumbrating the Gothic themes slumbering in Gray’s verse, his critics twisted “a polemic on the nature and function of poetic language into a romance of compulsive mimesis--addiction and repetition.”

Lyric Fatalities

It is therefore curious that the profound intertextuality of the poem has spawned such divergent notions of its reception. On the one hand, we find Hazlitt recalling that “Mr. Wordsworth had undertaken to shew that the language of the Elegy is unintelligible.” Views of this kind echo Gray’s insistence on the peculiarity of poetic language and its estrangement from common speech. Yet the majority of readers have followed Samuel Johnson’s judgment of the work: “The Church-yard abounds with images which find a mirror in every mind, and with sentiments to which every bosom returned an echo. The four stanzas beginning ‘Yet e’en these bones’ are to me original: I have never seen the notions in any other place; yet he that reads them here persuades himself that he has always felt them.” From Jonson’s account, it appears that Gray has laid the groundwork for Baudelaire’s poetic program of “inventing clichés”--essential to the enchantment exercised by kitsch--of writing poems as if they had been “uttered by the Zeitgeist” (in Guillory’s phrase)--despite the peculiarity of their language. Leslie Stephen describes even more precisely how the poem, a repository of poetic clichés, acts in turn like a commonplace book upon the memory of its readership: “The Elegy has so worked itself into the popular imagination that it includes more familiar phrases than any poem of equal length in the language.”

Johnson’s recognition of the popularity of Gray’s poem must be reconciled, however, with his acknowledgment that Gray’s poetic diction is “remote from common use.” The poem appears to be at once contrived and intuitive, arcane and popular. This dichotomy does in fact reflect two prevailing yet divergent assessments: Gray’s poetic diction is said to be unnatural, arcane, and unintelligible, yet also popular, stereotypical and familiar. Both of these views are contained, as I mentioned, in the antithetical usage of the word “commonplace.” The practice of commonplacing, which is the methodological key to the aesthetic of kitsch, succeeds in arresting poetry in two ostensibly divergent ways: by removing poetic language from history and actual usage, so that it becomes increasingly insular and arcane; but also by endlessly repeating poetic clichés, thereby cultivating an artificial, common language--a counterfeit vocabulary available to a mass audience.

Yet the “Elegy” is not a pastiche, and Gray’s use of “appropriated phrases and measures” is not to be read in a satiric vein. The poem is not self-conscious or reflexive about its commonplace method and refrains from ironizing its “phraseology.” Indeed, the fatalism of Gray’s rhapsodic (i.e., anthological) method may be contrasted to the wickedly satirical mode of Alexander Pope’s poem, “Lines of a Person of Quality,” a poem composed entirely of borrowed phrases, figures, and sentiments. Pope, unlike Gray, deliberately pushes his commonplace lines towards bathos and doggerel:

Thus the Cyprian Goddess weeping,
Mourned Adonis, darling Youth:
Him the boar in silence creeping,
Gor’d with unrelenting Tooth.

Some of the same effects--though inadvertent--can be detected in Gray’s synthetic verse, but Pope signals that the bathos of his lines is deliberate--he ironizes the clichés--by depicting and exposing to ridicule the rhapsodic mode of composition:

Cynthia, tune harmonious Numbers
Fair Discretion, string the Lyre;
Sooth my everwaking Slumbers:
Bright Apollo, lend they Choir.

Yet the song culled from the borrowed “Choir” is less an integral poem (as Pope’s title indicates) than a collection of disparate “lines,” a spectacle of poetic “stooping”:

Thus when Philomela drooping,
Softly seeks her silent Mate,
See the Bird of Juno stooping;
Melody resigns to Fate.

The final line of Pope’s satire therefore suggests that poetry, resigns itself to a pathetic “Fate” by re-signing (signing again and again) the verbal clichés of the poetic tradition.
Pope’s nonsatiric poetry is, of course, implicated in the stereotypical tradition he mocks, just as the “drooping” fate to which poetry resigns itself evokes the graveyard setting--the commonplace--of melancholy:

Mournful Cypress, verdant Willow,
Gilding my Aurelia’s Brows,
Morpheus hov’ring o’er my Pillow,
Hear me pay my dying Vows.

Gray, by contrast, views the “Fate” of commonplace poetry not as a satirical subject (as Pope does), but as equivalent to the “dying Vows” of the swain in the churchyard. More precisely, the “dying Vows” of the melancholy figure in Pope’s poem signify quite literally, from Gray’s perspective, the language of poetry arrested by the commonplace method of reinscription. In essence, this caesura--the stilling of poetic diction--confronts poetry with its mortality, its own possible death, yet we have already seen that this verbal seizure is only one possible death among several advancing upon the genre of poetry: Wordsworth’s erasure of the distinctions between the languages of poetry and prose; the equation of poetry with feeling rather than the material act of writing; the withdrawal of poetry’s essence into the sensibility of the poet: each of these possible revisions pushes poetry towards an impasse.

Much of Gray’s poetry (he wrote less than a thousand lines) is preoccupied with death, melancholy, and sensuous anomie in ways that are consistent with the narratives of poetic decline espoused by many poets and critics (including Wordsworth and Jeffrey), which in turn derive from Vico’s genealogy of increasing abstraction (and enervation) in “the progress of poesy” (to borrow the title of one of Gray’s odes). More specifically, the “Elegy” and “The Bard” (another one of Gray’s odes) feature melodramatic and, perhaps one could say, influential suicides. Goethe’s Werther, for example, encounters--before he takes his own life--a figure he calls “the wandering gray bard who reaches for the footsteps of his fathers on the vast heath and finds alas! Only their tombstones.” Gray’s “Elegy” is, of course, set in a graveyard, where the speaker imagines his own death and funeral, and composes his own epitaph. At least one Gray scholar has noted as well as a premonitory aspect of Gray’s poetic suicides, in relation to the notorious fate of the poet, Thomas Chatterton, a spectacular suicide in 1770 (some 20 years after the publication of Gray’s “Elegy”). One might even construe the suicidal drive of Frankenstein's monster--a poet of sorts--to be a legacy of Gray's doomed poets. Whatever may be the legacy of Gray’s suicidal bards, there can be little doubt, as Jean-Pierre Mileur has noted, that “Death is especially privileged in this vision as the intersection of the poet’s personal fate and the fate of poetry in the imminent future.” Furthermore, Mileur remarks, “For Gray, the inevitability of death extends to poetry, which is moving inexorably throughout the poem towards its ultimate reduction to epitaph.”

Before the speaker of the “Elegy Written in a Country Church Yard” becomes, through the apparatus of the poem, a witness to his own disappearance, he stages the recollection of his solitary and disturbed behavior by “some hoary-headed Swain”:

‘Mutt’ring his wayward fancies he wou’d rove,
‘Now drooping, woeful wan, like one forelorn,
‘Or craz’d with care or cros’d in hopeless love.

The possibility that the sudden disappearance of the speaker’s alter ego (noted by the Swain and his friends) may be a suicide is reinforced by lines that formed the poem’s conclusion in the original Eton manuscript of the “Elegy”:

Hark how the sacred Calm, that broods around
Bids ev’ry fierce tumultuous Passion cease
In still small Accent whisp’ring from the Ground
A grateful Earnest of eternal Peace

No more with Reason & thyself at Strife;
Give anxious Cares & endless Wishes room
But thro’ the cool sequester’d Vale of Life
Pursue the silent Tenour of thy Doom.

With his disappearance, the speaker becomes by the end of the poem a spectator at his own funeral, overhearing a “kindred Spirit” read aloud (for the illiterate swains) the lengthy epitaph the speaker has prepared for his own gravestone--the final 12 lines of the “Elegy.” The somber but genial epitaph recalls the tone of one of Gray's earliest published poems, "Ode on the Death of a Favourite Cat, Drowned in a Tub of Gold Fishes." But the poem’s closure with the epitaph of the speaker also anticipates the restriction of Gray’s own poetic production to a few epitaphs composed for friends after he formally stopped writing poetry in 1753 (several years after he completed the “Elegy”) at the age of 36. In 1757, he was offered the Poet Laureateship, which he refused.

The implied suicide of the speaker of the “Elegy” becomes explicit in the fate of the speaker of “The Bard,” whose death is announced precipitously in the final lines of the poem:

He spoke, and headlong from the mountain’s height
Deep in the roaring tide he plung’d to endless night.

The bard’s suicide is emblematic, as I indicated earlier, of the fate of poetry, enunciated elsewhere in the poem:

‘A Voice, as of the Cherub-Choir,
‘Gales from blooming Eden bear;
‘And distant warblings lessen on my ear,
‘That lost in long futurity expire.

Poetry suffers a similar fate in “The Progress of Poesy”: “But ah! ‘tis heard no more--/Oh! Lyre divine, what daring Spirit/Wakes thee now?”

Ultimately, Gray’s most significant poems reveal that the poetics of the commonplace--the halting of poetic language--enacts not simply the dying vows of poetry, but the suicide of the poet--a speech act whose "felicity" is ensured only by its duration, its continuity, and indeed by it endlessness. More precisely, and more in keeping with its Gothic implications, the "death" of poetry turns out to be a live burial, a secreting of poetic language within the "chaste" and generalizing diction of literature For if kitsch, the direct descendent of the commonplace method, can be understood as the self-inflicted and self-sustaining death of poetry (as so many modernists would argue), then poetry's ending, its self-consumption, is interminable, an enduring form of resistance to the middling, bourgeois ideology of literature.

Lest one presume that the confrontation between Gray and Wordsworth over the “gross and violent stimulants” of poetic diction did not establish the terms of a polemic that continues to haunt the fate of poetry, or that the lyric fatalities of Gray’s poetic production were terminal events, one need only recall the notorious abandonment of poetry by one of modernism’s most gifted poets, Laura Riding. After announcing her repudiation of poetry in 1938, Riding returned repeatedly to the grounds of her disavowal, explicating her poetic beliefs: “The difference of the poetic use of words was precious: the difference must be served with a devout separate-keeping of the poetic and the non-poetic verbal practice.” Further, she explains, “The price of poetic freedom of word was poetry’s having the identity of a mode of verbal expression outside the norms of expression that language, as the common human possession, seemed to ordain to be natural, ‘ordinary’ practice.” Her commitment to poetic diction reached a crisis, however, with the “degeneration of the ‘language’ of poetry into a compound of super-ordinary ‘ordinary language’”--into what she called “the super-mongreloid.” As a result of the public conversion of poetic language, she concludes, “I found poetic utterance arrested [emphasis added] even in its being poetic utterance: it adumbrated a potentiality that was not developable within it, its limits of achievement was the adumbration of potentiality. I ended, in my movement in the poetic path, at no-end.” As these statements demonstrate, the arresting of poetry over the “potentiality”--and dissolution--of poetic language continues to evolve, and to resonate, as a poetic event within the disciplinary horizon of literature.

High Barbary

What survived poetry’s composition of its own epitaph in Gray’s poetry was precisely the method of the commonplace, which had succeeded in arresting the language of poetry even as it transformed itself into a prototype of the mechanism of repetition that would sustain mass culture and the genre of kitsch. The method of the lyric automaton prevailed even as the gingerbread details of poetic diction--archaism, elision, syntactical inversion--were revised and supplanted by a new generation of poetic special effects. In fact, Gray was among the early connoisseurs and fabricators (including Macpherson, Percy, and others) of the archaic ballads whose often spurious diction contributed to the “glare and glitter” of Gothic verse condemned by Wordsworth. In the Preface, Wordsworth targets not only the “vicious” materials of poetic diction, whether classical or pseudo-vernacular, but the mechanism of their popularity. The method of the commonplace book--what John Guillory calls Gray’s “systematic linguistic normalization of quotation”--could be applied to Greek and Latin sources, or to “popular” epics of ancient “poesy.”

Francis Jeffrey thus notes a continuation of commonplace methods, with a changing array of sources: “the new poets are just as great borrowers as the old; only that, instead of borrowing from the more popular passages of their illustrious predecessors, they have preferred furnishing themselves from vulgar ballads and plebian nurseries.” Poetic diction shifts from the “motley masquerade” of Gray’s classicism to the “motley masquerade” of distressed native genres--both equally popular and equally far removed from common speech: “Instead of ingenious essays, elegant pieces of gallantry, and witty satires all stuck over with classical allusions, we have, in our popular poetry, the dreams of convicts, and the agonies of Gypsey women.” In fact, the poetic diction of Gothic verse--the first fully realized province of poetic kitsch--swings wildly between slang and “literary pomp,” synthesizing a language of “calculated impurity,” according to Donald Davie. As a genre, poetic kitsch first appears in a transitional space between “residual” and “emergent” literary cultures (to borrow the terminology of Raymond Williams), between the antique confection of belated classicism and the new barbarism of counterfeit balladry. What is surprising about this transition--and essential to the popularity of kitsch--is that the “quaintness, hieroglyphics, and enigmas” of poetic diction are normalized, engraved in the popular imagination, by an accelerated and technological mode of the commonplace book, by a kind of poetic automation.

Archaism, with regard to word choice and word order, is certainly among the most common and powerful of the verbal ”special effects” associated with poetic diction. More specifically, the persistence of verbal archaism in the balladry of the Romantic Revival must be understood as an extension of the antiquarian cast of late classicism--both concerned with the preservation of poetic diction--but also as a way of appropriating, and refashioning, the substance of the vernacular.

Rejecting the purity of diction intrinsic to the hegemony of literature, and contesting the premise that a basic model of the vernacular (Standard English) should be grounded in the “language of conversation” and “polite letters,” defenders of poetic diction sought to anchor the vernacular in deposits of archaic usage (whether native ballads, classical formulae, or rustic speech) possessing the atavistic trait of the commonplace. Thus Gray was concerned to develop, according to John Guillory, “a poetic diction which replicated within the vernacular a distinction like the distinction between classical and vernacular literacy. This distinction could be articulated as an essential difference between poetry and prose.” More compellingly, Gray responded to the privileging of prose “by reworking the vernacular precisely in order to estrange it from itself, to invent a kind of vernacular Latin.” Defenders of poetic diction therefore weathered the demise of classical literacy by sourcing the vernacular to native, atavistic sources and by grounding the language of poetry in a vernacular estranged from itself. Understandably, then--from the perspective of those defending a purity of diction based on polite conversation--Samuel Johnson condemned poets who “conceive it necessary to degrade the language of pastoral, by obsolete terms and rustic words, which they very learnedly call Dorick, without reflecting, that they thus become authors of a mingled dialect, which no human being ever could have spoken,...joining elegance of thought with coarseness of diction.” Yet “Dorick” diction (an allusion to the earliest presumed order of Greek style) therefore resembles in its “mingled aspect, one must acknowledge, the classical paradigm of synthetic vernaculars.

In this polemical context, one can see quite clearly, as Guillory notes, that “poetic diction is not simply archaic: it represents a reaction against polite letters as the emergent discourse of the bourgeois public sphere.” While verbal archaism, as a device intrinsic to the replicative methods of the commonplace book, may certainly be regarded as a means of arresting poetry (and popularizing it), it is also implicated in a more complex discourse of inversion, resistance, and return. For, as Owen Barfield notes, “True archaism does imply, not a standing still, but a return to something older, and if we examine it more closely, we shall find that it generally means a movement towards language at an earlier stage of its own development.” In this sense, poetic archaism--understood as a return to language in its youth, as youthful language--is, Barfield asserts, “the very opposite of conservatism.” Archaic deposits of vernacular language, sequestered from the history of usage and abstraction, therefore offer a means of preserving and, at the same time, radicalizing, poetic language, a fusing of archaic diction with the substance of the vernacular. Mingled in the new pop genre of Gothic verse, impressed upon the public by commonplace methods of inculcation, and challenging the ascendance of “polite letters,” these elements of poetic diction lay the foundation for the miscreant genre of kitsch.

Pictured: Image from the cover of Patrick Moran's wonderful new book, Doppelgangster, coming soon from Main Street Rag.

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

The New Poets: Another Installment of... Make It New, Already!

"...the new poets are just as great borrowers as the old; only that, instead of borrowing from the more popular passages of their illustrious predecessors, they have preferred furnishing themselves from vulgar ballads and plebian nurseries.”

-- Francis Jeffrey, review of Wordsworth’s poems, orig. pub. in the Edinburgh Review 11 (October 1807)

Stay tuned to my blog for a second installment of Daniel Tiffany's "Arresting Poetry" in which this quotation, and much more, will be discussed...

Monday, August 22, 2011

Ding dong kitsch is death: Daniel Tiffany on Arresting Poetry



I've seen kitsch in museums and in a few living rooms, which is, as far as I'm concerned, the extent of where it probably belongs. As the term itself appears now and then in discourse about poetry, however, "kitsch" remains unclear to me: tossed around like other pigeon-holing labels, albeit with fewer birds, arguably, to occupy the holes. Kitsch: what the hell is it? Fortunately, Daniel Tiffany is on the case! With his very generous permission, I'm pleased to be able to feature a preview of some hot shit work Daniel's doing on this very subject. Here goes... Ready?? I've even turned comments on again...

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Daniel Tiffany

Inventing Clichés: A Genealogy of Kitsch and Poetry

Kitsch is a term associated in most people’s minds with certain kinds of visual images or furnishings characteristic of mass culture, often considered to be sentimental, vulgar, or fraudulent in some way. Long before it had been reduced to a synonym for mediocrity in the arts, however, the term kitsch functioned as a lightning rod in debates about mass culture and the fate of modernism confronting the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. For a term now applied quite casually to trivial and spurious things, kitsch has a surprising history of provoking alarm and extremism: Hermann Broch called kitsch “the element of evil in the value system of art.” Adorno refers to kitsch as “poison” and, drawing upon the German etymology of the term, as “artistic trash.” Clement Greenberg later referred to the “looting” and “traps” associated with kitsch, to its criminal aspect. In these same essays, the “evil” of kitsch acquires an array of sinister qualities: it is said to be at once parasitic, mechanical, and pornographic; a “decorative cult” and a “parody of catharsis.”

Inquiries into the nature of kitsch are not uncommon in debates about popular culture, yet even the most astute contemporary observers usually overlook a central feature of the inaugural theorizations of kitsch: poetry is identified in the foundational essays on the subject as a primary exemplum and genealogical source of kitsch. Robert Musil, for example, in his essay of 1923, “Schwarze Magie” (Black Magic), responds to the question “what is Kitsch?” by mocking the work of “poet X,” who is at once a “popular hack” and a “bad Expressionist.” Later, in a more influential essay of 1933, Hermann Broch develops his theory of kitsch as a “Luciferian” phenomenon (fallen from the heights of Romanticism) in reference to the poetry of Novalis, Stefan George, and Mallarmé. Even more prominently (in an American context), Clement Greenberg’s essay of 1939 initiates its polemical formulation of kitsch (heavily dependent on Broch’s ideas) by drawing a contrast between the modernist poetry of T. S. Eliot and the songs of Tin Pan Alley. In addition, Greenberg, like Broch, points to Romantic poetry (Keats, in this case) as a progenitor of modern kitsch.

Certainly, it is not surprising that Musil and Broch (along with Walter Benjamin, as we will discover in a moment) approach kitsch from a literary perspective, since they are themselves literary critics and theorists, in addition to being authors of literary texts. As a result of the literary orientation of these critics, the inaugural essays on kitsch offer grounds for assigning to poetry a significant place in the genealogy of kitsch, yet this orientation no longer informs our presumptions about kitsch. It would be unthinkable now to claim, for example, that the problem of kitsch could be traced to certain notorious events in the history of poetry. From the perspective of poetry, however, there are those--starting with Wordsworth in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads--who would assert that the fate of poetry since the Romantic Revival of archaic and demotic traditions has been frivolously and dangerously entangled, in so many words, with the problem of kitsch. Because the values of kitsch and of “serious” poetry (even the most progressive and experimental kinds) remain deeply polarized, however, it is impossible to say how such statements, were they found to be true, might affect our understanding of kitsch or of modern poetry. No charge more damaging can be brought against a poem, especially one subscribing to the tenets of modernism, than to describe it as kitsch. Yet it is precisely for this reason, I will argue, that the full significance of kitsch can be revealed only by excavating its forgotten relationship to poetry.

The present injunction against discussing kitsch and serious poetry has not, however, as I indicated earlier, always been observed. In one of the earliest essays on kitsch--certainly the first to appreciate its dialectical appeal--Walter Benjamin activates the verbal figurine of kitsch by referring (in the first sentence of his text) to the dream of the blue flower (the epitome of poetic artifice) suffered by Heinrich von Ofterdingen (the medieval poet-protagonist of Novalis’ eponymous novel): “One cannot truly dream of the blue flower any more. He who wakes up today as Heinrich von Ofterdingen must have overslept.” Casting von Ofterdingen in the role of a proto-Surrealist poet, Benjamin brings up to date (by putting to death) the unavowable liaison between kitsch and poetry: the Traumkitsch (dreamkitsch) of Surrealism spells the end of poetry, he claims: “Louis Aragon reports how the mania to dream spread throughout Paris. The young people believed that they had found a secret to poetry--in reality they brought an end to poetry.” Poets heeding the methods of Surrealism, Benjamin concludes, need only dream to do their work. At the same time, “Dreams are now a pathway to the banal,” Benjamin declares, “The side which things present to dreams is kitsch.” Hence the historical development of “dreamkitsch” spells the end of poetry, even as it discloses the secret life of everyday things. Poetry turns to “mottos” and “gossip.”

Although kitsch appears to be a factor in the eclipse of poetry, it does not, surprisingly, spell the end of the avant-garde, since Benjamin equates kitsch and the avant-garde (in the form of Surrealism). For Benjamin (as for Adorno), poetry mediates the relation between kitsch and Surrealism in a way that destabilizes the antithesis (advanced by Greenberg) between kitsch and the avant-garde. Reactivating poetry’s relation to kitsch may therefore expose the grounds for a new formulation of the avant-garde.

The concept of kitsch emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century in Germany, but was not fully activated as a critical term until the 1920s and 1930s, when it acquired (through the foundational essays I cited above) the traits and connotations it still possesses today--though bereft of the implications of poetry. Since its formulation nearly a century ago, the general parameters of the modernist bias against kitsch have therefore remained largely intact. Kitsch is said to be the antithesis of “true” art,--what Greenberg calls “synthetic art.” An assertion of this kind harbors the basic attitudes towards kitsch promulgated by modernists--of various persuasions--who defined it: derision, condescension, resentment. In fact, the historical usage and etymology of the word (from the German verb, kitschen, to smear or scrape together) have always betrayed a note of contempt. It is crucial, however, to emphasize that the term kitsch has, because of its persistently derogatory connotation, been used historically only within a highly restricted segment of society. What the elite calls kitsch, many people would simply call art, and the garbled equation of art and kitsch fuels the anxiety surrounding kitsch.

The modernist attack on kitsch and mass culture did not, of cause, go unanswered. Rooted in the neo-Marxist orientation of the Frankfurt School, a furious critique on several fronts (ideology, semiotics, identity politics) has steadily undermined the polarization of high and low culture informing the modernist definition of kitsch, advancing a continuous theoretical and critical transvaluation of the means of popular culture. In the recent history of the visual arts, for example, the collision between the neo-modernist ideology of Abstract Expressionism and Pop Art in the 1960s represents the most significant episode in the ongoing sublimation of material culture. Similar confrontations are developing, I will argue more fully below, in contemporary poetry.

One might therefore presume, as a result of these powerful challenges to the modernist demonization of popular culture, that the usefulness of kitsch as a concept has run its course. Perhaps the idea of kitsch no longer has anything interesting to tell us about the relationship between popular culture and the avant-garde, precisely because the distinction between the two has been--at least in theory--abolished. Does the possible erasure of this distinction imply that the avant-garde has been vanquished by kitsch, or does kitsch, by contrast, acquire a new subversive edge?

Modernism’s puzzling (and now forgotten) emphasis on poetry as a framework for understanding the banality of everyday art suggests that the concept of kitsch may still have the power to ignite controversy--certainly regarding poetry’s significance for early theorizations of kitsch but also, more provocatively, regarding poetry’s susceptibility to the value system of kitsch. Standing apart from the ongoing desublimation of visual art into visual culture, modern poetry, despite the recent valorization of techniques such as appropriation (sampling “other” texts), has only begun to assimilate and transform the values intrinsic to the discourse of kitsch: artificiality, sentimentality, insularity. The first generation of New York School poets (O’Hara, Ashbery, et al) may indeed have revived the diction of the conversation poem and dared to make verse from scraps of trivia and everyday experience, but their poems are not now lauded, nor are they viewed as significant, because they are deemed to be fraudulent, vague, commonplace, or popular (though they may be all of these things).

Poetry’s stubborn resistance to incorporating and transforming the values of kitsch requires it to ignore the tentative orientation towards poetry and poetics already available within the modernist definitions of kitsch. And contemporary scholarship exerts little or no pressure on poets to think about the problem of kitsch. Poetry’s role in shaping the origins of kitsch has been, as I indicated earlier, almost entirely ignored by later generations of kitsch theorists: Svetlana Boym, Danilo Kis, Celeste Olalquiaga, and Susan Sontag (on camp, an ironized mode of kitsch) make no mention of poetry in their otherwise valuable and astute studies of kitsch. (Matei Caliescu does, to his credit, briefly consider the properties of poetic kitsch in his book on modernism.) Poetry’s disappearance from the discourse of kitsch stems almost certainly from shifting models of reception, audience, and mass culture within the ideology of poetic modernism (articulated by Greenberg but also by Cleanth Brooks and the New Critics), which has had the effect of alienating poetry--in public opinion--from mass culture.

The shadowy relations between kitsch and poetry are, at the same time, irresistibly and ruinously dialectical: even as the poetics of modernism requires the erasure of poetry from the discourse of kitsch, poetry itself becomes--even for certain modernists--the veiled essence of kitsch. One becomes witness to the abject ritual of poets repudiating poetry (evidence of the anathematic substance of kitsch): Laura Riding, for example, abandoning poetry for its truthlessness (its spurious nature); or Marianne Moore’s famous denunciation (“I, too, dislike it”) motivated by the equation of poetry and “all this fiddle.” Thus poetry may disappear from the discourse of kitsch, but the specter of kitsch gradually consumes the reputation of lyric poetry (even poetry obsessed with eliminating the filth of kitsch). By condemning kitsch to the realm of the abject, poetry enables the equation of poetry and kitsch.

What appears to be a dereliction of the fate of poetry in contemporary accounts of kitsch may stem from a curious lapse in the inaugural essays of Benjamin, Musil, Broch, and Greenberg. In each case, one finds assertions about the significance of Romantic poetry and poetics for a general model of kitsch, supplemented by comparisons between authentic and degraded modes of verse within the poetic tradition. Yet one searches these essays in vain for an explanation of how a linguistic phenomenon with apparently little or no relation to mass culture (Romantic poetry), and one preceding significantly the historical emergence of kitsch in modern, industrial culture, could legitimately serve as a model for theorizing the ubiquity and banality of industrial artifacts in popular culture. In what ways do the conditions of Romantic poetry prefigure the copycat mentality and the sensationalism of popular culture? How is the logic of kitsch encrypted in the origins of modern poetry? The inaugural formulations of kitsch, although they assert the relevance of serious poetry to kitsch and popular culture, do not provide answers to these questions. In this sense, the curious silences riddling the foundation of kitsch turn into gaping holes in succeeding generations of kitsch theory: poetry simply vanishes from the map of popular culture because its atavistic relation to kitsch can no longer be traced or illuminated.

Following the essential and irreversible advances in our assessments and understanding of popular culture, kitsch must now be regarded as a moribund concept whose full significance can be revealed--and reactivated--only through a critique of its seminal but forgotten relations to poetry. My aim is, accordingly, to try to recover the specific conditions, or events, in the history of poetry which motivate the puzzling, modernist assertions of poetry’s significance for kitsch. Identifying how certain poetic events anticipate and model the general properties of kitsch will establish new grounds for expanding the conversation about poetry and kitsch initiated, but also foreclosed, by modernist formulations of kitsch. Such an investigation will inevitably trouble certain basic assumptions, as I have indicated, about modern poetry’s susceptibility to the values of kitsch and about the significance of these affinities for our understanding of kitsch in general. The prospect of disclosing these affinities promises as well to set in motion a revision of the basic parameters of kitsch as it pertains to material culture, to renovate the material economy of kitsch in the image of poetry--that is, to produce a poetics of kitsch.

Disclosing the relevance of poetry for our understanding of kitsch--and vice-versa--must inevitably occur as a confrontation between values associated with modernism (formal integrity, originality, concreteness, accuracy, authenticity, immediacy) and a set of values which inevitably appear, through the filter of modernist ideology, to be perverse if not incomprehensible. Baudelaire’s declaration of his poetic intention to “invent a cliché” (créer un poncif) nicely captures the perversity of the values associated with kitsch. Assessing the relation between the immobility of the cliché--a means of arresting poetry--and the possibility of mutation within a closed “genetic” system will be one of the principal theoretical tasks at hand in renovating the concept of kitsch.

To write critically about kitsch must entail a deliberate appropriation--and transvaluation--of the term “kitsch.” The most concrete verbal evidence of such a revision might be a shift in the usage of the word “kitsch”: the prospect, for example, of using it as a transitive (or intransitive) verb applied to a poem, an author, a discipline, a period (in a manner resembling the recent shift in the usage of the term “queer”). One might find it useful, or necessary, to kitsch a poem or a body of work.

The insights to be gained from reconstructing and elaborating the concept of kitsch in this manner will emerge not by focusing on its most obvious referent--popular and material culture--but by attending to what has disappeared from the discourse of kitsch: poetry and poetics. In this regard, Arresting Poetry [will not be] a book about kitsch in general, or even about kitsch and material culture, but about kitsch and poetry. To that end, I do not seek to directly accommodate poetry to existing insights about material culture, or to make poetry comply with received models of kitsch as it pertains to material culture. Rather, it is my intention, as I indicated a moment ago, to develop a specifically poetological orientation towards kitsch, which will in turn influence our views of poetry written since the Romantic Revival, not to mention our presumptions about the nature of kitsch in material culture.

Any attempt to produce a poetics of kitsch must begin by acknowledging that, as a result of modernist inhibitions or forgetfulness, we simply have no idea how to identify precisely something called poetic kitsch. Though it appears, perhaps, to have certain rhetorical features and to possess distinct ethical connotations--bad!--kitsch in poetry is a genre without qualities (to echo the title of Musil’s great novel), without a distinct verbal profile. No critical vocabulary appears to be available for describing the verbal properties of kitsch in poetry--crucial to establishing a basic paradigm--or for developing a coherent account of these properties. We can’t really be sure what constitutes kitsch in a poem: is it or isn’t it? This uncertainty can be demonstrated quite easily by presenting a bouquet, so to speak, of possible examples, antecedents, and variants of poetic kitsch (fragments of kitsch drawn--for the sake of brevity--from poems evoking in their entirety the physiognomy of kitsch). Take a moment or two to appraise the specimens I have assembled below (names of poets withheld in order to eliminate prejudicial factors in the reader’s judgment).

Frail golden flowers that perish at a breath,
Flickering points of honey-coloured flame,
From sunset garden of the moon you came,
Pale flowers of passion...delicate flowers of death...

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The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals, on a wet, black bough.

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I dreamed I moved among the Elysian fields,
In converse with sweet women long since dead;
And out of blossoms which that meadow yields
I wove a garland for your living head

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I remember after Christmas shopping coming home and
gloating over everything I bought.

I remember Rosemary Clooney and Bing Crosby and "I'm Dreaming of a White Christmas."

I remember how sad and happy at the same time Christmas carols always made me feel: all warm inside.

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See! the white moone sheens onne hie;
Whyterre ys mie true loves shroude;
Whyterre yanne the mornynge skie,
Mie love ys dedde,
Gon to hys deathe-bedde,
Al under the wyllowe tree.

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Here she lies, a pretty bud,
Lately made of flesh and blood;
Who as soon fell fast asleep
As her little eyes did peep.

-------------------------------------

Dash'd by the wood-nymph's beauty, so he burn'd;
Then, lighting on the printless verdure, turn'd
To the swoon'd serpent, and with languid arm,
Delicate, put to proof the lythe Cadusean charm.

-------------------------------

Kmart
Taco Bell
KFC
Staples
J. Crew
Kmart
KFC
Kmart
Taco Bell

Kmart
KFC
Kmart

----------------------------------------------

White flower,
Flower of wax, of jade, of unstreaked agate;
Flower with surfaces of ice,
With shadows faintly crimson

----------------------------------------
Bereft of rune-gates.
Smoke is on the plaster,
Scarred the shower-burghs,
Shorn and shattered,
By eld under-eaten.

--------------------------------------

Porgy, I'se yo' woman now,
I is, I is!
An' I ain't never goin' nowhere 'less you shares de fun.

-------------------------------------

But all the time
I'se been a-climbin' on,
And reachin' landin's,
And turnin' corners,
And sometimes goin' in the dark
Where there ain't been no light.

------------------------------------

So looks Anthea when in bed she lies,
O'ercome or half betrayed by tiffanies:
Like to a twilight, or that simpering dawn
That roses show when misted o'er with lawn.

-----------------------------------------------------------

Now the storm begins to lower,
(Haste, the loom of heel prepare,)
Iron-sleet of arrowy shower
Hurtles in the darkened air

--------------------------------------------

O my kitten a kitten,
And oh! my kitten, my deary,
Such a sweet pap as this
There is not far nor neary.

-------------------------------------

I hoped that he would love me,
And he has kissed my mouth,
But I am like a stricken bird
That cannot reach the south

--------------------------------------------------------

First, my Motorola
Then my Frette
Then my Sonia Rykiel
Then my Bulgari
Then my Asprey
Then my Cartier
Then my Kohler
Then my Brightsmile
Then my Cetaphil
Then my Braun
Then my Brightsmile
Then my Kohler
Then my Cetaphil
Then my Bliss
Then my Apple
Then my Kashi
Then my Maytag
Then my Silk
Then my Pom

-------------------------------------------

Mourn, all ye little gods of love, whose darts
Have lost their wonted power of piercing hearts;
Lay by the gilded quiver and the bow,
The useless toys can do no mischief now.

------------------------------------------

One’s assessment of these examples may suggest that we know poetic kitsch when we see it (we like to think), but who is to say--if your opinion, dear reader, differs from mine--who is correct? There are no specific, verbal criteria in place--much less a general theory--to articulate our judgments about poetic kitsch, or to settle a dispute about it. Yet we do seem to possess certain intuitive markers or guidelines--based perhaps on usage--about what constitutes kitsch in poetry. The fact that our intuitive judgments about poetic kitsch may be based in our sense of the spectrum of usage--rather than any meaningful familiarity with poetry itself--tells us something important about kitsch in poetry: poetic kitsch takes root in verbal connotation, in expressive values acquired through, or against, common usage. Kitsch in poetry therefore exercises certain social powers of language, revealing a social ontology that precedes, or suspends, as we shall see, the domain of the personal.

Let me return, however, to my sampling of test cases, to my little “horn-book” of poetic kitsch. Let’s try to sort out what might allow us to say what is kitsch and what is not. I am not inclined to divulge, as I said, the authors of these fragments (though this would hardly be necessary in those cases that are well known), since one of the distinguishing features of poetic kitsch is its lack of originality, its anonymity--however well known it may be. Kitsch in poetry turns out to be deeply and perversely rooted in the poetic tradition, which explains the historical reach of my little field guide, ranging from the early seventeenth century to the present moment. Many of these passages are by canonical poets--all composed originally in English--including certain influential literary forgeries, though some examples will perhaps not immediately be acknowledged as part of the tradition of poetry in English, or indeed as conforming to our intuitive assessments of poetic kitsch.

My decision to omit samples of “amateur” kitsch reflects my views concerning the complex relations of kitsch (even the most insipid or vulgar forms of it) to the poetic tradition and to the historical concept of literature. The historical emergence of poetic kitsch in the late eighteenth century signals, I will argue, a schism between poetry and literature. This enduring (and frequently unacknowledged) antipathy expresses, by contrast, the grounds for an affinity between mass culture and poetry, a common backwardness that refuses to be subsumed within the aspirational system of “polite letters”--that is, within the historical invention of the category of literature. Choosing to work with examples of “high kitsch” (ostensibly a contradiction in terms)--whether canonical, academic, or avant-garde--will serve to demonstrate the saturation of “cultural capital” in all forms of kitsch, including the poetic kind, which is marked at once by familiarity and insularity. Exposing the submerged, canonical dimension of kitsch reveals not only the historical foundations of high kitsch but the inevitable transactions between high and low kitsch. The dangerous concentrations of “linguistic capital” in poetic kitsch offer therefore a crucial index of the mechanism of class in formulations of popular culture.

The earliest critical recognition of what we may call poetic kitsch occurs in 1810 in an essay by the founder of the Edinburgh Review, Francis Jeffrey, reviewing Walter Scott’s lengthy ballad, The Lady of the Lake. (Hermann Broch also identified Scott’s anachronistic ballads as examples of kitsch, echoing the essential insight of Jeffrey’s formative reception of Scott.) Examining the phenomenon of “very popular poetry” (exemplified by the archaic--or archaisized--poetic ballad), in contrast to poetry that appeals to more “refined taste,” Jeffries observes,
we know no way in which we could so shortly describe the poetry that pleases the multitude, and displeases the select few, as by saying that it consists of all the most known and most brilliant parts of the most celebrated authors--of a splendid and unmeaning accumulation of those images and phrases which had long charmed every reader in the works of their original inventors.
Francis here acknowledges that “popular poetry” consists of passages purloined from the poetic tradition and, by implication, that popular poetry (kitsch) differs from serious poetry not in its verbal substance, but in the arrangement of materials borrowed from the tradition. Thus, on the basis of this formulation, one could argue, for example, that the arrangements of synthetic verse produced by the Pre-Raphaelite school later developed a more programmatic vision of Scott’s antiquarian pop.

Astonishingly, Francis concludes--in the earliest judgment of the merits of kitsch--that the difference between popular and “refined” poetry is not to be found in the subject itself: “It is not, then, because the ornaments of popular poetry are deficient in intrinsic worth and beauty that they are slighted by the critical reader, but because he at once recognizes them to be stolen, and perceives that they are arranged without taste or congruity.” Though the “beauties” of popular poetry may be stolen and displayed in bad taste (in a manner offending the refined reader), their “intrinsic worth” is equal to those found in the exalted sources from which they have been stolen. One cannot emphasize too strongly the fundamental difference between Jeffrey’s assessment of the qualities of poetic kitsch and the judgments we have inherited from modernist definitions of kitsch: measured by the criterion of pleasure, popular poetry can claim the same significance as poetry appealing to more restricted tastes. And it possesses the dubious, but potentially transgressive, value of greater social resonance. One would also want to note that Jeffrey’s foundational definition of poetic kitsch (and his positive evaluation of it) emerged in the colonialist context of Scottish nationalism, the same context in which the “distressed genre” of the ballad (the subject of Jeffrey’s review) had emerged nearly a hundred years earlier.

Returning to the golden treasury of verse I’ve assembled, let me pose once again the basic question: what verbal qualities do we find to be intrinsic to these examples of poetic kitsch? One notices certain themes recurring: erotic or passionate love; death and encounters with the dead; martial conflict. Yet these themes, common as they may be, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for poetic kitsch. One also notices immediately the recurrence of certain images or tropes, a distinctive iconography, among these poems: flowers, twilight, dawn, airy phenomena (clouds, mist), pale colors, mythological creatures, precious materials (gold, silver), shadows, darkness. Some of these tropes (such as darkness or flowers, or even the phenomenon of color itself) may serve as subtle, reflexive emblems of poetic kitsch, yet none of these tropes, however much they may share with familiar modes of kitsch in other media, are either necessary or sufficient criteria for the existence of kitsch in poetry.

The consistent thematics and iconographies of these verse fragments fail to establish (despite their coherent appeal) a foundation for poetic kitsch because they are not sufficiently verbal in a material and structural sense. One must be able to identify certain specific verbal properties consistent with all of these samples in order to be able to establish the grounds--a working definition--for poetic kitsch. To meet this requirement, I will argue that kitsch in poetry is determined primarily by its diction and, more precisely, by what we call poetic diction--a view consistent with Jeffrey’s emphasis on the shared verbal substance of popular and serious poetry. Despite the presumed transparency of kitsch, however, the criterion of diction is not necessarily its most accessible feature. On the contrary, from this perspective, diction may be experienced by many readers as a subliminal aspect of a text, both as a reservoir of the poetic tradition and as a garbled echo of common speech.

The substance of poetic kitsch draws upon the aspect of language that is most susceptible to commodification (advertising, propaganda, social media), a language integrating calculation and enchantment. By harnessing language for indiscriminate ends, whether virtuous or indecent, poetic kitsch is worldly yet strange, superficial and seductive. Kitsch in poetry thus restages the ancient and insidious alignment of literature and rhetoric, a coupling that isolates poetry from its other potential suitors, ethics and history. Poetic kitsch shows no interest in describing either physical or psychological worlds with accuracy, in authenticity or originality, or in technical virtuosity. The authority of poetic kitsch lies not in its powers of representation, which are in fact extremely weak, but in its ability to express through its synthetic diction an impersonal, social “substance” concealed by ideology. In its essence, what kitsch expresses lies beyond personal experience. Hence, kitsch in poetry strives to be vague, insensible, formulaic, spurious, miscreant. What is at stake finally--to borrow Walter Benjamin’s famous trope for the manifestation of pop art--is the decay of the poem’s aura of originality, which allows poetry to become--via the traits of its reproducibility--the impersonal expression of millions of souls: a mass ornament.

Among the canons of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, etc.) diction pertains to elocutio, the crafting of speech or writing. More specifically, as an aspect of elocutio, diction involves figures of speech, understood not as tropes but, more concretely, as the physical patterning of language. Diction itself is an ancient and durable critical concept, first defined by Aristotle and revised many times since at crucial junctures in literary history (by Dante, Dryden, Samuel Johnson, Wordsworth, Coleridge, T. S. Eliot, Laura Riding, and so on). In the broadest sense, which extends well beyond the confines of literature, diction pertains to the control of syntax, orthography, word order and, most importantly, word-choice or vocabulary--elements often associated in a literary sense with the question of style. Strictly speaking, “style” would be the narrower term (though we often use it as a synonym for diction), as Donald Davie explains: “there is no Miltonic diction in Milton; there is only Milton’s style.” For Miltonic diction, one must turn to the works of his followers, a criterion revealing the deliberate and essentially recursive nature of poetic diction.

The elements of diction combine to produce certain tonal qualities in language, which become the objects of the mechanism of taste. As a result, poetic artifacts displaying divergent sorts of diction can be objects of good taste, or of bad taste--as one commonly assumes about kitsch. The question of diction is always a matter of a particular diction, determined either by policing or relaxing the boundaries of particular vocabularies and syntactical elements. Whether through closure or transgression, exclusion or transmission (and sometimes translation), the substance of a particular diction is always determined at its borders.

The concept of diction was central to debates about poetry and poetics throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the values and implications of the problem of diction were largely eclipsed by the rise of modernism and its preoccupations with form, innovation, and historical discontinuity. This displacement may be explained in part by the fact that diction does not ordinarily extend to questions of form in a literary sense, though certain forms (sonnet, villanelle, sestina) may become auratic icons of poetic value, allowing them to function, like diction itself, as indices of taste and social stratification. The suppression of a poetics oriented around questions of diction in the context of modernism may also help to explain the withering of a critical vocabulary adequate to the values of poetic kitsch--and to the curious disappearance of poetry itself from the discourse of kitsch. The suppression of kitsch in the context of modernism has thus been accompanied by the suspension of those critical concepts and vocabularies (such as diction) that might have illuminated the properties of kitsch as something other than an obstacle to modernist experimentation.

Only with increasing attention to the implications of textual practices such as appropriation and sampling, which disclose and deploy the subliminal aspects of diction, has vanguard poetic practice begun to acknowledge and reactivate the question of diction--though it must be emphasized that the parameters of diction (and sometimes kitsch) have remained essential to the production of conventional lyric poetry in defiance of poetic modernism. The polemics of modernism have therefore produced an unprecedented equation of lyric poetry and kitsch, of high and low. Equally disorienting, in a demonstration of the hegemonic thrust of modernist ideology, the emerging vanguard experimentation with diction (via sampling and appropriation) is sometimes portrayed as an extension of modernist formalism--though appropriation and formalist innovation sustain distinctly different systems of value. If anything, recent experiments in diction (a few of which appear in my primer of poetic kitsch) appear to be testing and developing in new ways the concept of kitsch in poetry.

The question of whether one views various modes of appropriation in modernist texts as manifestations of formalism is crucial to one’s understanding of the parameters and the effects of poetic diction. In my view, poetic practices such as citation and translation in the Cantos or The Waste Land contribute less to the poetic form of the text than they do to the range of diction accommodated within that text. Although citation, or appropriation, are implicated in the paratactic forms of modernist poetry (collage, montage), these practices do not constitute, or generate, innovations in form. They function, more importantly, as devices that extend and complicate the spectrum of diction available in the poem--in ways that often involve archaism. Pound’s poetic personae, for example--a translational practice essential to modernist poetics--allow him to smuggle into his poetic texts varieties of diction--often archaic or markedly “poetic”--which defy his own modernist principles. These verbal personae--clandestine reservoirs of poetic diction--are directly related to the citational means by which Pound elaborates the diction of the Cantos.

More generally, diction becomes a matter of “poetic diction,” a restricted vocabulary and set of compositional traits, chosen with certain goals in mind, as Owen Barfield explains: “When words are selected and arranged in such a way that their meaning arouses, or is obviously intended to arouse, aesthetic imagination, the result may be described as poetic diction.” Even poets (Wordsworth, for example, or Pound) who publicly disavow the “adulterated phraseology” and the syntactic irregularities of the poet’s inheritance fail to avoid the exigencies of poetic diction. Following the integration of vernacular writing (in English) into school curricula in Britain in the eighteenth century, along with the resulting controversies about the role of common speech in poetry, the “substance” of poetic diction became essential to maintaining distinctions between poetry and prose and to preserving the cultural value of poetry. More radically, at this historical juncture, reinforcing and supplementing poetic diction (from classical or native, and even counterfeit, sources) placed poetry at odds with the emerging category of “literature,” which aimed to subdue the verbal and cultural distinctions of poetry.

Diction in poetry is determined by its antecedents in verse, by a particular (and often contested) model of colloquial speech, and by the possible incorporation of syntactical irregularities and vocabularies alien to the existing terrain of poetic diction. From these disparate sources, a distinctive (and sometimes polemical) diction is synthesized, often involving the deliberate suppression of certain registers. At the same time, there are major poets (Chaucer, Shakespeare, Ashbery), and minor ones, whose vocabularies are so variegated that they disable the problematic of diction. (The casual dissolution of boundaries, it must be emphasized, is not equivalent to calculated transgression and deliberate impurities). Diction is therefore useful as a critical concept only to poetry that cultivates, rejects, or deliberately violates, specific vocabularies, syntactic signatures, and tonal effects. Poetic diction--whatever its qualities--always results, Donald Davie contends, from “an act of will, of contrivance and perseverance.”

On a larger scale, the problematic of diction becomes most visible in the history of English poetry when the native diction falls prey to the influence of external or archaic sources, whether it be Italian or French models during the sixteenth century; classical languages in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries; archaic (and sometimes invented) native sources in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; or nonliterary and technical vocabularies in the twentieth century. Poets and critics of various persuasions seek either to promote or to condemn such transactions. Even the most extravagant or grotesque verbal novelties, however, may ultimately be assimilated and sublimated within an expanded “poetic diction,” resulting in verbal textures--such as kitsch--that are at once eccentric and formulaic, barbarous and familiar, deviant and conventional, flamboyant and decorous.

Traditionally, the banality of kitsch is intertwined with formulaic--even compulsory--models of beauty: Broch, for example, calls kitsch “a new religion of beauty.” The correlation of banality and beauty is perplexing, however, since (as Broch’s thesis suggests) kitsch involves not merely the purification of beauty (i.e., the suppression of all qualities other than beauty), but exaggerated and even delusional regard for beauty. The banality of kitsch must therefore be reconciled with excessive beauty, a development suggesting that kitsch precipitates a crisis in the aesthetics of beauty. Adorno identifies a fundamental polarity between kitsch and beauty: “the phenomenon of kitsch, or sugary kitsch, is the beautiful minus its ugly counterpart. Therefore kitsch, purified beauty, becomes subject to an aesthetic taboo that in the name of beauty pronounces kitsch to be ugly.” As a form of exaggerated beauty, the ugliness of kitsch plunges the artifact into aesthetic turmoil.

Kitsch ruptures the aesthetics of beauty, combining incommensurability and banality--a grotesque beauty--in a way that exposes a startling concordance between poetic kitsch and the discourse of the sublime. As aesthetic categories, kitsch and the Romantic sublime both emerged within the context of Gothic literature, which seeks to deliver the strongest possible doses of wonder and dread. At the same time, the ultimate effects of both kitsch and the sublime depend on mediation, on buffering the subject from dread, passion, and danger, on securitizing the modern subject. The aesthetic securitization of the subject coincides, moreover, with a partial disabling of representation in both kitsch and the sublime--an orientation that is associated specifically (in Lessing, Burke, and Kant) with poetry. Both kitsch and the sublime are therefore primarily modes of expression designed in part to activate a moribund reader, a task revealing poetry’s significance--via kitsch--for theorizations of mass culture. The strong medicine delivered by kitsch and the sublime is experienced as cathartic --hence the importance of affect and sentiment--but ultimately as comforting. Through the mediation of style, kitsch and the sublime therefore convert the experience of shock into one of comfort, composure, and relief. The dialectic of shock and comfort mobilized by poetic kitsch demonstrates its relevance to mass culture.

Whether or not one views poetic diction as vicious or sublime, as a verbal spectacle to be suppressed in English poetry, or as the very essence of poetic language (in contrast to prose), kitsch is the direct outgrowth of a heightened and restricted vocabulary associated specifically with poetry and designed to elicit certain generalized “poetic” effects (which places it at odds with the category of literature per se). One could even go so far as to say that kitsch separates poetry from annihilation, or that kitsch emerges as the final, inextinguishable symptom of poetry’s essence--its ultimate defense. In poetry’s “closing time,” kitsch thus extends Poe’s doctrine of “compositional” effects to its limit, curtailing the functions of representation and meaning in order to foreground a poetics of pure effect. The orchestration of effects, it must be emphasized, pertains directly to the question of audience, of mass culture. Understood in this way, kitsch in poetry trafficks in aesthetic hyperbole, counterfeiting poetry in a language that defies particularity, yet captivates its audience: a hyperaesthetic formula radiating the common estrangement of “poetry.” From a corresponding angle, poetic kitsch might also be described as poetry-in-drag, not cross-dressing, but something akin to female female-impersonation or male male-impersonation: a cosmetic distilling of lyrical expression, a poetic doll. Kitsch in poetry thus enacts in material and syntactic terms a poetic melodrama, exposing at once the intrinsic falsehood of poetic diction and the adulterated essence of poetry.

It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that the decadence of kitsch--the rarefaction of its materials--is sustained by, and indeed expresses fundamentally, the imitative and reflexive logic of the poetic tradition. In this regard, kitsch subscribes to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of a “minor literature”: “only the possibility of setting up a minor practice of major literature from within allows one to define popular literature.” It is precisely the backwardness, passivity, and insularity of poetic kitsch (its ability to sublimate and neutralize even the most grotesque stylistic flourishes) which identify it as a powerful engine of simulation, conservation, and tradition. In a more basic sense, and under the most extreme conditions, the reproducibility and immobility of poetic kitsch may succeed in arresting poetry, in removing poetic language from external influence, from the continuous stream of historical incident. As a result, the domain of poetic diction functions both aesthetically and socially as a closed system of resonance and feedback, allowing for the possibility of collective experience based on the reverberation of shared conditions. The markers of individuality and discontinuity dissolve, even as the echolalia of an artificial, common language becomes an expressive matrix for cultural, and even political, cohesion. While the aesthetic significance of arresting poetry via the immobility of kitsch is ostensibly conservative, its political implications are less unambiguous. The reverberating totality of kitsch might, for example, serve as a precondition of revolutionary will for communities stripped of their capacities for self-recognition, cohesion, and solidarity.

Returning to a more narrowly poetic framework, kitsch is directly implicated in T. S. Eliot’s so-called “thesis of minority,” a model of the literary canon in which the diction of minor poets sustains--by its absence of originality or invention--the main features of the poetic tradition. The minor stance of a poet such as Dryden depends, according to Eliot, on his role in shaping “a language possible for mediocrity." Cultivating the diction of mediocrity, Dryden becomes influential “by reason of his precise degree of inferiority.” By this measure, kitsch stands not on the margins of poetic tradition, but at the very core of it. What remains occluded--and susceptible to revision--in Eliot’s thesis is the poetic substance of what he calls “inferiority” and “minority.” It is possible that the substance of poetic minority may disclose the conditions of poetry’s intrinsic antagonism to the criteria of literature (a resistance to the verbal and socioeconomic affinities of “literature,” which in turn becomes the basis of poetry’s harmonic relation--via kitsch--to mass culture).

Insofar as kitsch may be understood as the purest form of minor poetry, saturated with the highest concentration of poetic “capital” preserved by the tradition, the properties of mediocrity and inferiority serve as points of access to a kind of verbal unconscious of the English poetic tradition but also, as I indicated earlier, to the reverberations of class formation. It is precisely the reproducibility of poetic kitsch, along with its role as carrier of subliminal values and motives, which help to clarify how kitsch in poetry may be related to the condition of mass culture. For if the aesthetic category of kitsch enables mass culture by arresting poetry, it must be possible to explain how poetic kitsch participates in the subliminal domain of mass experience, even if it is not reproduced materially on a mass scale. The collective experience of language itself--its irrational synthesis of disparate voices, its drive towards impersonality--may be viewed as a paradigm of mass culture. Would it not therefore be legitimate to speak about verbal artifacts whose elements (the stuttering repertoire of poetic diction) are consumed and reproduced intuitively--without being materially produced--on a massive scale? Does poetic kitsch perhaps offer a basic paradigm for mass intuition --through a common, synthetic language--without mass production: pop without popularity, cult pop, subliminal pop, or even private pop?

In the twentieth century, Andy Warhol’s cryptic use of the terms “pop” and “plastic”--still veiled by the inattention of most art criticism on the subject--suggests that the New York poets who followed his revolutionary ideas and practice were fabricating a kind of poetic kitsch combining a deadpan “purity of diction” with the arcana of a visible underworld: a pop cryptonymy, a fusion of kitsch and the avant-garde. Perhaps even more importantly, the imitative paradigm sustaining the logic of kitsch is overturned, or neutralized, when kitsch becomes pop, releasing the artifact from the framework of judgment requiring it to be either real or fake, original or copy. A new kind of artifact emerges--a sampling, a nonmimetic forgery--the premises of which can be traced to the poetic foundation of kitsch.

The earliest formulations of poetic diction support the idea of kitsch (a precipitate of poetic diction) as a synthetic or “plastic” (in Warhol’s lexicon) phenomenon rooted in the vernacular. In order to avoid the “drab” style (consisting solely of common speech), Aristotle states that poetic diction requires a “blend” of unfamiliar and colloquial elements. Ultimately, if the drab substance of common speech anchors the effects of poetic diction, it must be supplemented by “ornamental” words in order to produce a synthetic medium. Thus commonplace language, insofar as it functions as the matrix of poetic diction, becomes a synthetic material--fabricated, impure, fraudulent--suggesting that poems written in the vernacular, or dialect, may constitute (as certain examples in my anthology suggest) forms of poetic kitsch. One might therefore adumbrate a theory of “synthetic vernaculars” mirroring the abject features of kitsch.

The artifice of blackface minstrelsy (employed by poets across the racial spectrum) may indeed be related--via the genealogy of poetic kitsch--to the so-called “ballad scandals,” the forged minstrelsy, of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the problem of fake or synthetic poetry associated with minstrelsy returns us to the basic premises of the inaugural, modernist essays on kitsch I cited earlier. More precisely, it returns us to the explanatory gap separating their two basic premises: kitsch is irremediably false, and kitsch can trace its roots to Romantic poetics. Now, as I’ve already indicated, none of these essays explains why poetry would be a suitable model for the proliferation of spurious artifacts associated with popular culture; nor do they give any specific or plausible grounds for linking a discourse of fraudulence directly to Romantic poetry. The missing link between poetry and fraudulence lies embedded, I will argue, in Romantic poetry’s affinity for, and contamination by, the varieties of counterfeit poetry produced in the eighteenth century. It is therefore my contention that kitsch (as a category of aesthetic artifacts) first acquired its association with fakery through a series of momentous and controversial literary forgeries. More specifically, the “distressed genre” of the counterfeit folk-poem made available a new palette of eccentric and even spurious poetic diction. Furthermore, “distressed genres,” according to Susan Stewart, “are close to kitsch objects, artifacts of exaggerated surface and collective experience.” Kitsch first found its bearings, one could say, during what Dwight Macdonald calls “the golden age of literary hanky-panky.”

The catechism of modern kitsch, let me reiterate, acquired its basic features during the Romantic Revival of spurious epics and ballads, including the fabrication of durable relic-genres (such as the nursery rhyme and the poetic melodrama). Starting with Lady Wardlow’s forgery of the Scottish ballad, “Hardyknute,” in 1716, and followed by a veritable deluge of spurious texts in the 1760s, the Gothic impulse in verse (sustained by a rhetoric of dubious and morbid animation) shadowed the development of Romantic poetry: the spectacular forgeries of Ossian, the bogus scholarship of Mother Goose, Percy’s “improved” Reliques of Ancient English Poetry, Chatterton’s Warholian factory of distressed (and ultra-hip) incunabula, William Henry Ireland’s sprawling manufacture of “lost” plays by Shakespeare.

Buried in this avalanche of counterfeit texts, one discovers the prototypical genre of poetic kitsch, the Gothic melodrama. First imported from France during the Revolutionary period of political subversion, the melodrâme combines (in a manner anticipating public “readings” of poetry in contemporary culture) music and spoken word, where poetry is recited over, or alternates with, incidental music. One of the earliest examples of the genre in English (A Tale of Mystery, 1802) was composed by Thomas Holcroft, a jacobin and political subversive (member of Thomas Spence’s London Corresponding Society), who was tried for sedition and imprisoned in 1794. Holcroft’s miscreant compositions may be compared to the earliest known example of a melodrâme in French, a Pygmalion written in 1760 by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Smartly furnished with antique figures and topical themes of social sublimation (the elevation of base materials), Rousseau’s poetical toy anticipates the Gothic tale of the Frankenstein monster, which may in turn be read as a symbolic narrative of the miscreant and counterfeit “creature” gone astray, bent upon the destruction of its master: an allegory of the forged materials of kitsch (a monster of borrowed language) and their fatal appeal to modern poetry. It is also worth noting that the apostrophes (and epitaphs) composed by the monster may be counted (along with the forgery and the melodrama) as contributing to one of the preliminary pseudo-genres of poetic kitsch.

Since poetic kitsch can trace its origins to eighteenth- century forgeries, restorations, and imitations of traditional ballads, one may also want to identify kitsch in poetry as one of the “crimes of writing” articulated by Susan Stewart. Yet to place kitsch, according to Stewart’s model, at the intersection of literature and legal definitions of intellectual “property,” or at the intersection of literature and the “forging” of history (as Ian Haywood’s model would require), inevitably results in a diminution of its poetic, or aesthetic, significance. This divergence from the scandal of equating poetry and kitsch can be rectified by placing kitsch, as I suggested earlier, at the junction of rhetoric and literature--a context that foregrounds the ancient and controversial relation between the calculated orchestration of verbal enchantment (rhetoric) and its creative expression (poetry). One begins to understand more fully the implications of Hermann Broch’s assertion that kitsch is “lodged like a foreign body in the overall system of art”--and all the more insidious, he notes, because one cannot easily distinguish between the two.

Reading kitsch into the polarized relation between literature and rhetoric lends coherence to its divergent sources: the eighteenth-century rhetorical practice of the “commonplace book” and the spurious diction (exemplified by forgery) of Gothic verse. Rooted in the classicism of the early modern period, the book of “commonplaces,” or verbal topoi, functioned as a compositional tool in which quotations from classical (and, later, vernacular) sources were recorded and memorized as the basis for a normative style of writing. Closely associated with the compositional method of eighteenth-century poetry, the commonplace book provided “a means of both consuming and producing texts” and, hence, functioned as a crucial device in the accumulation of the clichés and ornaments of poetic diction. Rejected, ostensibly, as a method of composition by Romantic poets, the normalizing procedures of the commonplace book nevertheless played a central role in assimilating the extravagant, but also popular, verbal textures, of Gothic verse to a new archive--oriented more broadly towards mass culture--of poetic diction. In this regard, the sublimating logic of poetic kitsch finds a methodological paradigm in the routine of the commonplace book, which trivializes the barbarous diction of Gothic verse and forged balladry.

The axis of literature and rhetoric also has the benefit of revealing the historical and theoretical correspondences between the simultaneous emergence of modern, aesthetic theory (Kant, Schiller, Hegel) and the recurring incidents of poetic forgery that lock into place the basic criteria of poetic kitsch. From this perspective, the modernist polemic antagonizing the relation between avant-garde art and kitsch finds expression as well in a philosophical critique (by George Bataille, Paul de Man, and others) seeking to highlight a schism between an authentic model of the aesthetic (said to be buried in the prose of Kant) and the unmarked, historical development of a fraudulent “aesthetic ideology.” The truth of aesthetics was quickly displaced, according to this critique, by aesthetic ideology, which cultivates the perversity of generalization. Poetic inversion, understood as the origin of kitsch, thus exemplifies a massive regime of special effects, of generality, in the arts. In this context, poetry, kitsch, and aesthetic ideology become targets of a positivist critique of false consciousness (and fraudulent artifacts). The most important--and least assimilable--inference of this critique is that aesthetic ideology (the fraudulent twin of genuine aesthetics) has never been about anything but kitsch. All our thinking about art has really been about kitsch.

The implications of the cumulative scandals of Gothic forgery, along with the residual influence of the commonplace book, emerged in a vehement debate over “poetic diction” in the Preface (along with other accessory texts) to the Lyrical Ballads in 1802. Wordsworth’s vituperative sketch and denunciation of the diverse temptations of poetic diction (“a motley masquerade of tricks, quaintnesses, hieroglyphics, and enigmas”) might be regarded as the earliest polemic against poetic kitsch (soon to be vigorously challenged by Francis Jeffrey) and a prototype of the modernist aversion to kitsch.

One could argue, however, that the very first symptoms of the problematic of kitsch appear considerably earlier in an age troubled, like the eighteenth century, by the importation of archaic materials and their effect on the native store of poetic diction. For it is among the Cavalier poets of the seventeenth century (who refashioned English as a medium for poetry after the examples of Latin and Greek) where one discovers the first tropes depicting the phenomenon of poetic mediation, an idea central to the problems of imitation, restoration, and indeed to forgery. Robert Herrick in particular appears to be intrigued by various translucent media (such as the so-called “tiffany,” a gauzy, linen veil) through which the world, especially nature and erotic objects, appears to be essentially ornamental and even illusory.

The atmospheric aspect of these tropes becomes more fully developed in Gothic verse (likewise concerned with the problem of mediation), where one discovers a whole range of meteoric, phenomenalistic, and ephemeral objects of perception, including Coleridge’s hallucinatory “spectres” and Keats’s dainty “silver proxy” (a figure of moonlight as both perceptual medium and aesthetic artifact). All of these ambiguous and immaterial objects function as tropes of derealization, of the emerging concept of aesthetic experience, but also, in their most hyperbolic forms, as emblems of kitsch. A later development of the rhetoric of mediation and forgery (concerned with the impact of foreign materials on poetic diction) occurs with the modernist “translations” and incorporations of Chinese, Anglo-Saxon, and Provençal materials (modernist variations of archaic “minstrelsy”). All of these later transactions, it must be emphasized, place the resources of kitsch in perilous proximity to the emerging practice of the poetic avant-garde.

The values associated with poetic kitsch--insularity, fraudulence, reproducibility--cannot be reconciled with the ideology of modernism. Immune to formal innovation yet employing a compound diction estranged from ordinary human speech (a synthetic and disfigured vernacular), kitsch fails to represent accurately the world or any type of subjective experience; representation is secondary to its expressive priorities. Indeed, the flight from representation is one of the seminal features, according to Deleuze and Guattari, of “minor literature”: “language stops being representative to move toward its extremities or limits.” Contrary, however, to assumptions that kitsch is the epitome of self-expression, kitsch in poetry works from the outside in, occupying a fictive interior with false feelings and specious phrases. The lyric subject becomes through verbal imposture the expression of inscrutable social and economic conditions. In its essence, kitsch is a mode of poetic expression renouncing both physical and psychological verisimilitude, resisting the dogmas of exteriority and interiority. Thus, to begin to understand the allure and significance of kitsch, one must employ a model of expression which is not disabled by the impersonality and the superficiality of kitsch, or by its lack of originality. Kitsch is purely cosmetic yet it also reveals the inscrutable conditions of the social cosmos.

What kitsch expresses, Kracauer contends in his monadological theory of the “mass ornament,” is incommensurable with its (and society’s) glittering surface, with the spectacle of its formulaic diction--though these elements are the irresistible triggers of a social trance, at once banal and apocalyptic. In the absence of any specific content, Kracauer contends, “in pure externality, the audience encounters itself; its own reality is revealed in the fragmented sequence of splendid sense-impressions.” What the mass discovers in the strange language, the worn-out phrases, the artifice--and the familiarity--of poetic kitsch is a reverberation, an allegory, of its own social being in historical conditions that would otherwise remain inscrutable. Consuming the borrowed poetic capital of one’s native tongue may be narcissistic, but “it is not,” according to John Guillory, “the pleasure of the individual’s recognition of his or her individuality; rather, it takes the form of identification with a social body expressed or embodied in the common possession of writer and reader, a common language.” The distressed genre of kitsch reveals to the mass its own social distress in a historical echo chamber of borrowed language.

Acknowledging the apocalyptic dimension of kitsch, Adorno muses, “What art used to be, kitsch may become in the future. Kitsch may be a correction to the decomposing trend in art, perhaps it is even the true progress of art.” Yet perhaps one need not wait for the future to assess Adnorno’s conjecture about the synthesizing (and synthetic) powers of kitsch: one need only scrutinize more closely the poetic origins of kitsch.